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Socially responsible investment in analyzed in a general equilibrium context. This is 
important in order to understand the ultimate consequences of SRI on the decisions of 
economic agents. Building on models by Brock (1982) and Merton (1987), SRI is 
modelled as the choice to voluntarily give up investment in stocks and bonds issues by a 
firm producing an externality. The model is used to analyze the utility costs of SRI to the 
responsible investor and the impact on the price of the stock issued by the firm which is 
responsible for the externality. The results shed light on the factors which may magnify or 
reduce the impact of SRI, among which are crucial the wealth commended in relative 
terms by the responsible agents and the diversification possibilities offered by the firms 
which are excluded from the investment opportunity set. A set of firms targeted by SRI 
may be seriously affected by SRI only if the responsible investors command a large portion 
of overall wealth; moreover the same firms are more likely to be hit by SRI behavior if 
they do not represent important diversification instruments. Firms with unique 
characteristics from the point of view of overall diversification are less likely to be the 
target of SRI. 
 
 
Keywords: General equilibrium, Redistributive effects, Public goods 
 
 
JEL: D50, H23, H41 
 
The author thanks Geoffrey Heal for useful conversations on the topic and Nicola Tosini 
for excellent research assistance in the numerical solution of the model. 
 
 











   1
 





SRI (socially responsible investment) can be described as an asset allocation style according to 
which securities are selected not only on the basis of their probability distribution and of the risk 
aversion of the investor but also taking into account characteristics of the companies issuing the 
securities. The typical case is that of a mutual or pension fund manager excluding tobacco stocks or 
polluting stocks a priori from his asset allocation. A good example dates from February 22, 2002, 
with the pension fund Calpers deciding to stop investing in Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia and the 
Philippines because of violations of human and worker rights. Also typical is an index-producer 
such as Dow Jones excluding firms from a socially responsible index. From this point of view, SRI 
may be regarded as a way of using the power of financial markets to take into account externalities 
that are normally ignored in a market equilibrium.  
The issue is topical for several reasons, including increased consciousness of the social 
consequences of firms’ activities, the increase in the amount of wealth managed by institutions, and 
the increasing fraction of this devoted to SRI funds, which in the US now manage 12% of the total 
of institutionally-managed funds. Recently the UK passed legislation requiring that pension funds 
invest a certain fraction of their assets according to socially responsible criteria. Most major fund 
management groups now have funds in the SRI field.   
The practical implementations of SRI are widespread. There are many socially responsible mutual 
funds and socially responsible indices managed according to a wide range of criteria. It is 
interesting to notice that most of these are specific to particular countries, at least in Europe. For 
example many Northern European countries regard alcohol production as bad, while Mediterranean 
countries are more inclined to regard smoking as particularly negative. There seems to be some 
correlation between the “typical sins” of each country and the concerns of those proposing socially 
responsible investing. This may reflect a sensation that many externalities are local in nature, or at 
least that the local financial community should try first to cure local problems. 
Some funds exclude classical negative externality-producers like tobacco and weapons companies. 
Others look at companies doing business with certain dictatorial governments not respecting human 
rights, as was the case of South Africa under apartheid. Others are more sophisticated and try to 
distinguish firms according to their compliance with the general rules of sustainable development.   2
From this latter point of view, there seem to be obvious connections with company-level 
applications of green and sustainable accounting. 
It is puzzling that very little research has been devoted to understanding the causes and effects of 
SRI, both at the theoretical and at the applied level, particularly given its rapid rise to prominence.  
The reasons for SRI are not entirely clear. It is presumably an attempt to use the power of capital 
markets to further social goals not normally attainable by market action, even though this may be a 
costly attempt. Various papers, for example Lakonishok et al. (1992), have discussed at length the 
agency problems associated with delegated financial management, and have concluded that pension 
fund investing is affected by many agency problems. SRI is mainly carried out by institutional 
investors like pension funds. Why would a rational pension fund decide to complete even further a 
very complex financial management problem by excluding potentially useful assets? Of course 
there is no agreement that investing in financial markets in a way that supports social goals is costly 
for the decision-maker. According to some practitioners, compliance with social duties is useful to 
identify best companies in terms of current and future profits. Responsible companies could be the 
ones which can afford a socially positive behavior because of their high overall efficiency. They 
could also be the ones which minimize future potential liabilities associated with operations which 
do not comply with best practices from  a social point of view. In short, responsible companies 
might well be the most profitable companies. 
In this paper we focus on the first possibility, i.e. that SRI is costly. In other words, we assume that 
there is no connection between company responsibility and company profitability. This makes the 
economic problem interesting. If social responsibility were one of the many dimensions of 
profitability then there would be no cost to SRI. Our purpose in instead to understand whether SRI 
is a costly method which is effective in changing the equilibrium of the economy. Do countries and 
firms that are discriminated against encounter any specific problems as a consequence? Before 
undertaking an SRI choice, decision makers who want to bear the cost also should make sure that 
the cost produces a result. Surprisingly, there is even less research on this question. While SRI 
funds advertise their financial performance, few document the attainment of their social goals. 
By building mutual funds or stock indices that only include socially responsible firms, proponents 
probably hope to change the behaviour of the excluded companies. But how exactly can these 
investment and index choices affect the firms and countries? Consider a case where the supply 
function of shares of a firm is vertical and the demand function is negatively sloped. Then exclusion 
of the firm from an index is likely to shift the demand function down and decrease the equilibrium 
price. The price must be lower to convince non-socially responsible groups to increase their holding   3
of the asset. However one could argue that the price of a stock is the present discounted value of its 
fundamentals. In this case the decreased demand on the part of one group of investors would be 
rapidly offset by an increased demand on the part of another group who would perceive the 
opportunity to buy stocks at a market price lower than value. SRI would have no effect on the price 
of the stocks, but only on the portfolio of the investors carrying out SRI. 
Even when there is an effect on the price of the stock it is far from clear what may be the final 
consequences. First it is not clear whether the effect would be a one-time decrease in market price 
or a sequence of falling prices. The latter would be more effective but would probably require an 
ever-increasing part of society obeying the rules of SRI to create a continuous shift of the demand 
function. Second it is not clear what the damage is for the firm, especially in the case of short run 
price pressure.  
This paper develops a simple two-period model which achieves two goals. First is to clarify under 
what conditions SRI may affect stock prices and expected returns. Second is to connect stock prices 
to firm investment and to final consumption in order to evaluate the effect of SRI on the general 
equilibrium of the economy. We have already clarified why we believe these are important issues 
which are missing from the theory. To remark on this, we believe that SRI may develop and attract 
a larger portion of investors only if it can be shown that there are specific and concrete effects. SRI 
is likely to remain a fashion which may easily pass by if it does not force firms and consumers to 
modify their behaviour.  
Assume that socially responsible investors bear an opportunity cost for their portfolio choice. Why 
should they take such a cost in the long run if SRI does not modify the equilibrium of the economy? 
On the contrary, assume that SRI does modify the general equilibrium of the economy through its 
effects on stock prices and returns. Then it may be plausible that ethical investors who did not 
choose in a socially responsible way, for example because they did not believe that this was a 
worthwhile effort, switch to the ethical side of the investment. An increase in the proportion of 
ethical investors would reinforce the original effect and further affect the general equilibrium. 
The plan of the paper is as follows. After this Introduction, in the second section we describe the 
general equilibrium model. In the third section we comment on the results obtained from numerical 
solution of the model. The fourth section concludes.   4
2. A general equilibrium model of SRI 
 
2.1 The model 
Our model is a two-agent two-period model. It is similar in the description of the investment 
opportunity set to the model proposed by Brock (1982), which is an early production version of the 
simple Lucas (1978) tree economy (for more recent attempts to introduce endogenous production in 
the Lucas model see for example Naik (1994), Abel (2000), Dai (2000)). In the Brock (1982) model 
a representative consumer with an infinite horizon decides how many resources to lend to firms and 
how many stocks to buy in order to maximize intertemporal utility. Firms use resources lent by 
consumers and carry out production which is subject to exogenous production shocks. After the 
loans are repaid, the profit of the firms are distributed to stockholders.  
This model is of interest because of its considering production processes and the possibility to 
include externalities going from production activities to utility. Given that we are going to model 
socially responsible investment as a discrimination choice on the part of a subset of the population, 
it is crucial to allow for heterogeneity of agents, since not all of them will behave in a socially 
responsible way. This heterogeneity however implies technical problems in the solution of the 
model. Lucas (1982) in a pure exchange economy can simply analyze the perfectly pooled 
equilibrium where the portfolio of the two agents are equal. The perfectly pooled equilibrium is not 
useful for our case because we want to study the consequences of heterogeneous behavior with 
respect to portfolio choice. Therefore we use a simple finite-horizon version of the model due to the 
technical difficulties associated with analysing heterogeneous-agent, infinite-horizon models 
involving heterogeneous portfolios of financial assets, production and externalities. Our choice is 
also justified by referring to Merton (1987), which considers a two-period economy for studying a 
financial market populated by heterogeneous agents.  
In our two-period model, consumers are denoted with i and j. Firms are denoted with A and B. The 
problem of consumer k, k=i,j, can be described as: 
0 , , 0 , 0 , , 0 , 0 , , 0 , , 0 , 0 ,
0 , , 1 , 0 , , 1 , 0 , , 1 , 0 , , 1 , 1 ,
1 , 0 , ) ( ) (   max
B k B A k A B k A k k k
B k B A k A B k B A k A k
k t k
z p z p x x W c
x r x r z z c
c u E c u
− − − − =





Consumer k maximizes a two period expected utility function. Initial wealth  0 , k W  is exogenous. 
Initially the agent selects consumption and resources invested in financial assets. Final consumption 
is given by the share of profits distributed by the two firms and by the interest paid on the loans.   5
1 , A π  is the time 1 profit of firm A,  0 , A p  is the time 0 market price of the stock issued by firm A, 
0 , ,A k z  is the quantity of stocks of firm k held by investor A at time 0. A similar notation is used for 
firm B.  1 , A r  is equal to 1 plus the rate of interest paid by firm A on the loan  0 , , t A k x  made by investor 
k at time 0. Determination of the interest rate and the price of the stocks obtains endogenously 
according to a mechanism that will be explained soon. 
The first order conditions for loan supply and stock demand of the investor are: 
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These first order conditions have the standard form, i.e. they equate the marginal disutility of saving 
to the expected marginal utility of the financial investment. 
Production and profit at time 1 for a generic firm k, k=A,B are described by: 
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where it is assumed that the production shows decreasing returns to scale. Production therefore is 
obtained by direct use of the loans made by the investors, but is subject to an exogenous shock 
which is firm-specific,  k Γ . Following Brock (1982), it is assumed that the shock is known to the 
firm when making decisions about the input of resources. Profit is what remains to the firm after 
paying the loan and the interest to the consumers. Profit is completely redistributed to shareholders 
in period 1. 
What is the difference between loans and stocks from the point of view of the investors? Following 
Brock we assume that the exogenous shock is unknown to the investors when these decide the size 
of the loans but it is known to the firm when the interest rate is set. Therefore both loan and stocks 
are risky for the investors which in the aggregate get hold of the whole production. The timing of 
decisions in the model is therefore the following: first agents determine their demand functions for 
consumption and financial investments in loans and stocks, then firms see the productivity shock 
and after that determine the demand for loans. Time 1 consumption is finally determined on the 
basis of the asset holdings and the productivity shocks which affect production and profit. 
The first order condition of the firm is simply:   6
0 ) ( ' 1 , 0 , = − × Γ k k k r x f  
where  ' f  is the marginal product. Remember that we assume that the firm knows the value of the 
productivity shock before deciding the level of production. The firm therefore takes up the amount 
of loans which is optimal for the realized productivity shock. 
 
2.2 The mechanics of the model 
We assume that there are two productivity shocks for each firm so that there are 4 states of nature at 
time t.  s A q ,  is the probability of the s-th state for firm A, s=1,2,  s B q ,  is the probability of the s-th 
state for firm B, s=1,2,  s q  is the probability of the s-th aggregate state, s=1,2,3,4. The aggregate 
states are described by the following combinations of shocks: 
2 , 2 , 4
1 , 2 , 3
2 , 1 , 2
1 , 1 , 1
  , 1   : for B)   2   state   and   A for    2   (state   4   state   aggregate
  , 1   , 1   : for B)   1   state   and   A for    2   (state   3   state   aggregate
  , 1   , 1   : for B)   2   state   and   A for    1   (state   2   state   aggregate
  , 1    for B)   1   state   and   A for    1   (state   1   state   aggregate
B A B A
B A B A
B A B A
B A B A
q q q v
q q q v
q q q v
q q q
× = − = Γ = Γ
× = + = Γ − = Γ
× = − = Γ + = Γ





where      and    v ε  are constant terms. Shocks are therefore independently and identically distributed. 
This production structure implies that the payoffs of the two stocks are uncorrelated when 
5 . 0 1 , 1 , = = B A q q . This assumption is clearly important for evaluating the consequences of exclusion 
of one of the two assets from the portfolio of any investor. The zero correlation assumption can be 
justified on the basis of the results of Campbell et al. (2000), showing that the average correlation 
between two stocks in the US market has decreased over time and is currently very close to 0. In 
order to also analyze the case of high correlation, which could hold true for the case where the 
stocks of the two firms in the model represent two international stock markets, one can assume the 
following structure of joint probabilities: 
4 . 0 , 1 . 0 , 1 . 0 , 4 . 0 1 1 1 1 = = = = q q q q  
where the first and the fourth state have a higher probability than the other two states. Negative 
correlation could be described by: 
1 . 0 , 4 . 0 , 4 . 0 , 1 . 0 1 1 1 1 = = = = q q q q  
At the initial time the investor, given available wealth, has to make a consumption and portfolio 
decisions. The portfolio is potentially composed of four risky assets, two issued by each firms. The 
rates of return obtained from the assets are positively correlated for each firm across the two states:   7
given the size of the capital leant for productive processes, the higher the productivity shock the 
larger the returns on both assets. After the consumption and portfolio decisions are taken the 
productivity shocks are realized and observed by the firms, which finally demand loans on the 
market. 
Equilibrium is characterised by the following equations: 
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A x x 0 , 0 ,   and    are the amounts of loan taken up by the two firms in state s at time 0. 
We have therefore a system of 18 equations to be solved for 18 endogenous variables. The 18 
equations are: the supply function of loans on the part of the two agents (2 equations), the demand 
function for two stocks on the part of the two agents (4 equations), 8 equilibrium equations between 
loan demand and supply, the 4 demand functions for loans (4 equations). The 18 variables are the 2 
stock prices, the 2 interest rates, the 2 demand for loans, the 8 loan supplies, the 4 stock demand. 
Notice that this system does not impose any non-negativity constraint on the variables, in particular 
on the supply of loans and on the demand for stocks on the part of the investors. A negative value 
for the supply of loan, for example  0 , ,A i x , is compatible with the equilibrium as long as  0 , ,A j x  is 
positive and large enough to make the total supply of loan to firm A positive in equilibrium. A small 
negative loan on the part of consumer i to firm A and a large positive loan on the part of j to the 
same company in the aggregate is equivalent to a positive loan of the consumers to the firm together 
with an internal system of loans whereby consumer i borrows resources from consumer i. The 
interpretation of this case may refer to a sort of internal financial system, where agents can lend 
resources to each other. The firm of this stylized model therefore both implements production 
activities and carries out the role of financial intermediary for personal loans. 
A similar interpretation occurs in the case of a negative holding of stock. In equilibrium the supply 
is fixed so the two consumers together have to hold the stocks. However there can be internal 
contracts between the two consumers according to which one lends resources to the other with a 
remuneration contingent on the future valuation of the stock.   8
 
2.3 SRI and externalities 
We now interpret SRI as a reaction to externalities. Many of the examples of SRI we have 
mentioned in the introduction can in our opinion be interpreted in this way. Discrimination against 
tobacco reflects concerns about the social effects of smoking, which are strictly associated with the 
externalities arising when it is not possible to separate smokers and non-smokers in the population. 
Even when separation is possible, there are indirect externalities associated with the demand for 
resources produced by smokers who contract some illness due to smoking. In a system where it is 
not possible to internalise all medical costs, non-smokers have an interest in reducing the number of 
smokers. Discrimination against environmentally unfriendly companies may be interpreted the 
same way. In various cases it is technically impossible to isolate environmental damages as these 
are global in nature. 
Of course it is possible to find other examples. Discrimination against firms producing weapons 
might also be explained on the basis of the possibility that the weapons will directly affect the 
utility of the agent. However it might also be explained as a reaction to the possibility that weapons 
will affect other agents. This would be a truly altruistic behavior where the agent internalizes the 
negative consequences for other agents. However to capture this effect we would need a much more 
sophisticated economic structure, which is left to future research. 
The externality we consider is a negative effect of demand for loans of firm A on the utility of the i-
th agent, whose utility function becomes 
) , ( ) ( 1 , 0 0 , A i i x c u E c u δ +  
with  0 ) , ( ' 1 , < A i x x c u . Remember that the specification implies that productive capital equals the 
value of loans, so this is a way to describe a negative external effect of the capital used in 
production of one firm on welfare. The reason why the negative externality regards consumption at 
time 1 is that in such a way the consumer may hope that the socially responsible investment may 
affect the choices of the polluting firm through the indirect effects of market prices.  
It would also be possible to consider the case where the agent is not sure about the future negative 
externality. For example firms might be discriminated against for their contribution to future 
pollution and non sustainable behavior on the basis of an estimate of the damage inflicted to 
society. This damage might turn out to be non existent or very weak if some future technological 
innovation is used to eliminate the negative consequences of production. For example, the airline 
industry is the largest source of  2 CO  emissions but is exempt from any extra charges for the   9
emission of greenhouse gas. However there is no scientific agreement on the climate change issue, 
so that private agents may decide to proceed with discrimination of the industry on the basis of an 
estimate of possible future damages associated with  2 CO  emissions. In the model, we could assume 
that the agent might therefore attach a probability n to the case of a future damage, so at to 
maximize: 
[ ] ) ( ) 1 ( ) , ( ) ( 1 , 1 , 0 0 , i
s
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This case however does not change the qualitative characteristics of the model, it simply affects the 
quantitative results making less strong the socially responsible investment process with respect to 
the case where n=1. 
It is worth noticing that the externality affects the first order condition of agent i if the utility 
function is non-separable in future consumption and the externality: 
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To model SRI we refer to the financial side of Merton (1987) which assumes that investors are 
heterogeneous in their information sets about securities. They decide to trade only stocks for which 
they have information. The model shows how heterogeneous information sets impact stock prices 
and returns. More precisely it is shown that stocks of firms with smaller investor bases have 
relatively larger expected returns, and lower prices, than in the comparable complete-information 
model. Here we assume that one of the two agents decides a priori to finance only one of the two 
firms in the economy, voluntarily giving up the possibility of diversification offered by investment 
in the polluting firm. Extending the behavioral assumption of Merton (1987) to the case where 
exclusion is justified by SRI may imply that the stocks of externality-producing firms will be 
damaged in equilibrium by means of the negative effect on the price level. 
We interpret this model in terms of the impact of ethical considerations on the demand for assets 
issues by firms. We define agent i as the social responsible investor. In the minimal case he decides 
not to invest in the stock of firm A, the firm which is responsible for the externalities in the model. 
Therefore  0 0 , , = A i z . In the maximal case he also decides not to lend resources to firm A,  0 0 , , = A i x . 
In the latter case discrimination is extended simultaneously to both assets
1. Notice that there is a 
                                                 
1 This is not unrealistic. In June 2003 nine major banks from seven countries have decided to adopt guudelines (known 
as “Equator principles”) for project finance in emerging markets, requiring the banks to adhere to the IFC (International   10
difference between discriminating with stock and discriminating with loans. In the model the former 
does not affect production activity but the latter does. This difference reflects the working of the 
economic system in the short run, lacking rights issues from firms. We will return to this in the 
conclusions, when commenting possible extensions of the framework.  
Investor i therefore exposes herself to a dramatic decrease in the investment opportunity set. By not 
diversifying, she forces herself to hold a suboptimal portfolio which is concentrated on firm B. It is 
also possible to extend the model to allow for negative externality of the firm towards the second 
consumer as well: 
) , ( ) ( 1 , 0 0 , A j j x c u E c u δ +  
Production on the part of A in this case affects both consumers. In such a way one creates an 
indirect effect of SRI on the part of consumer i on consumer j. Such indirect effect is one element 
that may stop investors from actively implementing SRI.
2 
We  can use the model to study a few interesting elements. What are the effects of the 
discrimination carried out by agent i? What are the effects of discriminating against stocks in terms 
of overall equilibrium? Is it helpful to discriminate against loans? What is the utility loss of the 
discrimination? What is the utility transfer between agents i and j following unilateral 
discrimination? What is the damage inflicted to the firm which produces the externality? 
In order to answer these questions we will numerically solve the model. The presence of 
heterogeneous agents requires this technique, as in equilibrium the two investors will end up with 
different portfolios and consumption choices. 
 
3. Results 
We have solved numerically the model due to the presence of various asymmetries, a standard 
procedure in the literature on the equity premium see for example Heaton and Lucas (1992). 
Initially we only explor the model which includes externality on consumer i (columns 3-5 of the 
table). The utility functions are constant relative risk aversion of the type: 
α γ α α δ α
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Finance Corporation) social and environmental rules for sustainable development. This implies that the banks will not 
provide loansa directly to projects where the borrower cannot comply with certain requirements. 
2 For example Tom Jones, in an interview with the Financial Times, published in Financial Times Fund Management 
June 16, 2003, said that “There is a free-rider problem. If we spend money to do shareholder activism, Citigroup asset 
management shareholders bear the expense but don’t get a benefit that is distinct from other shareholders”.     11
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The parameter δ  is fixed at 0.9 in all the computations. The parameters α  is set equal to 0.5 and 
alternatively to 4 in order to analyze the impact of risk aversion on the solution. Calibration of the 
parameter γ  is more difficult. We will calibrate the parameter in such a way to control for the total 
decrease in utility for consumer i associated with the externality with respect to the baseline case of 
no externality. For example, we will see that when externalities are ignored and  5 . 0 = α , the total 
value of loans to firm A is about 0.2. With this value, a choice of  1 = γ  is coherent with a 20% 
reduction of consumption of consumer i associated with the external effect, while a choice of   
5 . 0 = γ  is associated with a 10% reduction of consumption. Therefore 1 and 0.5 will be the two 
values considered in the exercizes. A similar computation will be performed for the other sets of 
parameters, yielding  3 . 0 = γ  and 0.6 when risk aversion is high. The production functions assume 
decreasing returns to scale with a parameter  4 . 0 = β . 
To start, we have solved the model assuming no externalities and no SRI (second column of Table 
1), externality but no SRI and finally SRI without externalities. The rows represent the symbols 
used in the text to describe the model, that is respectively demand for stock issued by firm A on the 
part of i and j, stock demand for firm B on the part of the two consumers, price of stock A and price 
of stock B, loans to firm A by i and j, loans to firm B by i and j, rate of interest paid by firm A in the 
two states of nature, rate of interest paid by B, production of firm A in the two states, production of 
B, profits of A in the two states, profits of B, utility of i, utility of j. 
   12






consumer i, no SRI 
Externality on 
consumer i, no SRI 
  0 = γ   5 . 0 = γ   1 = γ  
0 , ,A i z   0.5000 0.5062  0.5130 
0 , ,A j z   0.5000 0.4938  0.4870 
0 , ,B i z   0.5000 0.5062  0.5130 
0 , ,B j z   0.5000 0.4938  0.4870 
0 , i c   0.7644 0.7363  0.7055 
0 , j c   0.7644 0.7773  0.7913 
A p   0.3533 0.3648  0.3774 
B p   0.3533 0.3648  0.3774 
0 , ,A i x   0.1178 0.1296  0.1424 
0 , ,A j x   0.1178 0.1136  0.1091 
0 , ,B i x   0.1178 0.1296  0.1424 
0 , ,B j x   0.1178 0.1136  0.1091 
1 , A y   0.6169 0.6249  0.6334 
2 , A y   0.5048 0.5112  0.5182 
1 , B y   0.6169 0.6249  0.6334 
2 , B y   0.5048 0.5112  0.5182 
1 , A π   0.3702 0.3749  0.3801 
2 , A π   0.3028 0.3067  0.3109 
1 , B π   0.3702 0.3749  0.3801 
2 , B π   0.3028 0.3067  0.3109 
i u   3.2062 3.0133  2.9239 
j u   3.2062 3.0960  3.0968 
 
 
In the absence of externality and SRI the equilibrium is symmetric. Each consumer holds ½ of the 
available stock, and the market prices of the stock are equal. Loans are equal. Production, profit and 
the interest rates are constant across firms even though they vary across states of nature. Consumers 
have the same utility level.  
Introduction of a small externality (with no SRI) affects the equilibrium because the optimal choices 
of consumer i are affected due to non-separability between the externality and consumption. 
Consumer i decreases the demand for the stock of the polluting firm and gives less loans to the 
same firm, however he also varies the demand for assets associated with the non-polluting firm. 
This can be explained on the basis of the first order conditions of consumer i. The presence of   13
externalities reduces the future marginal utility of consumption; this provides an incentive to 
increase immediate consumption, to provide less loans and to invest less in the stock market. In 
equilibrium however the supply of stocks has to be held, and consumer j increases the demand. In 
order to give an incentive, the price of stocks goes down. 
Consumer j also reacts to the change in prices by decreasing initial consumption, partly undoing the 
decreased saving of consumer i. Utility of consumer i  decreases while utility of consumer j 
increases. Production and profit of both firms decrease due to the incentive to consume a larger 
portion of the initially available resources. 
An increase in the importance of the externalities from 1.1 to 3.5 magnifies these effects. 
Table 2 analyzes the case of high risk aversion. 






consumer i, no SRI 
Externality on 
consumer i, no SRI 
  0 = γ   3 . 0 = γ   6 . 0 = γ  
0 , ,A i z   0.5000 0.3563  1.6359 
0 , ,A j z   0.5000 0.6437  -0.6359 
0 , ,B i z   0.5000 0.5072  1.4792 
0 , ,B j z   0.5000 0.4098  -0.4792 
0 , i c   0.6821 0.6473  0.6096 
0 , j c   0.6821 0.6845  0.6881 
A p   0.4767 0.4998  0.5265 
B p   0.4767 0.4998  0.5265 
0 , ,A i x   0.1590 0.2483  -0.4027 
0 , ,A j x   0.1590 0.0857  0.7539 
0 , ,B i x   0.1590 0.1723  -0.3204 
0 , ,B j x   0.1590 0.1615  0.6715 
1 , A y   0.6956 0.7092  0.7238 
2 , A y   0.5690 0.5800  0.5919 
1 , B y   0.6956 0.7092  0.7238 
2 , B y   0.5690 0.5800  0.5919 
1 , A π   0.4173 0.4521  0.4344 
2 , A π   0.3413 0.3474  0.3549 
1 , B π   0.4173 0.4252  0.4344 
2 , B π   0.3413 0.3473  0.3549 
i u   -2.2744 -2.6932  -3.2647 
j u   -2.2744 -2.2769  -2.2693 
   14
 
The results are qualitatively similar except that there are lower transfers of resources between one 
period and the other. This is not surprising as this model, contrary to the more general class of 
models introduced by Epstein and Zin (1989), is unable to distinguish between risk aversion and 
elasticity of intertemporal substitution. In the model used in this paper a higher risk aversion 
therefore also means lower willingness to substitute consumption over time. Indeed Table 2 shows a 
smaller increase of the initial consumption of the two agents with respect to the case described in 
Table 1. In the case of high impact of the externality agent i shorts both stocks and bonds in order to 
anticipate consumption. 
The main interest of the paper is in the general equilibrium effects of SRI. We therefore now 
analyze the case of responsible behavior of agent i in the presence of various degrees of 
externalities. 
Table 3: SRI and externalities, various degrees of risk aversion 
 
  5 . 0 , 5 . 0 = = γ α   1 . 1 , 5 . 0 = = γ α   3 . 0 , 4 = = γ α   6 . 0 , 4 = = γ α
0 , ,A i z   0.0 0.0  0.0  0.0 
0 , ,A j z   1.0 1.0  1.0  1.0 
0 , ,B i z   0.7458 0.7716  1.0994  2.1981 
0 , ,B j z   0.2542 0.2284  -0.0994  -1.1981 
0 , i c   0.7375 0.7005  0.6926  0.6048 
0 , j c   0.7765 0.7993  0.6829  0.6917 
A p   0.3629 0.3778  0.4860  0.5107 
B p   0.3661 0.3815  0.5192  0.5457 
0 , ,A i x   0.0 0.0  0.0  0.0 
0 , ,A j x   0.2419 0.2519  0.3252  0.3404 
0 , ,B i x   0.3539 0.3848  0.2914  -0.2759 
0 , ,B j x   -0.1099 -0.1305  0.0552  0.6393 
1 , A y   0.6235 0.6337  0.7016  0.7147 
2 , A y   0.5102 0.5185  0.5734  0.5849 
1 , B y   0.6258 0.6361  0.7197  0.7335 
2 , B y   0.5120 0.5205  0.5888  0.6010 
1 , A π   0.3741 0.3802  0.4210  0.4288 
2 , A π   0.3061 0.3111  0.3431  0.3511 
1 , B π   0.3755 0.3817  0.4316  0.4396 
2 , B π   0.3072 0.3123  0.3528  0.3614 
i u   3.0114 2.9041  -2.8171  -3.3848 
j u   3.0970 3.0980  -2.2412  -2.2263   15
 
 
The Table shows that SRI has little impact on the general equilibrium, even though there are 
important effects on personal portfolios. SRI on the part of consumer i deeply affects the 
distribution of stockholdings and the distribution of loans. Consumer j ends up being the owner of 
the polluting firm, with a strong reduction in the stockholding of firm B and a much more 
concentrated stock portfolio. Overall concentration of financial holdings of consumer B is 
counterbalanced by changes in the loans given to the two firms. In equilibrium the price of stock A 
is now lower than the price of stock B, as predicted by the model by Merton in the case of 
asymmetric demand. Total utility marginally decreases for consumer i and marginally increases for 
consumer j. The most relevant result is that there are weak price effects on the market prices of both 
stocks. Consumers substitute each other in stockholdings. There are weak effects on production and 
profits. 
Table 4 investigates the effects of a reduced form of SRI, consisting of excluding only stocks:   16
Table 4: SRI directed at stocks only 
  5 . 0 , 5 . 0 = = γ α   1 . 1 , 5 . 0 = = γ α  
0 , ,A i z   0.0 0.0 
0 , ,A j z   1.0 1.0 
0 , ,B i z   0.5909 0.607 
0 , ,B j z   0.4091 0.393 
0 , i c   0.7362 0.6998 
0 , j c   0.7773 0.7943 
A p   0.3645 0.3798 
B p   0.3649 0.3802 
0 , ,A i x   0.2072 0.227 
0 , ,A j x   0.0361 0.0265 
0 , ,B i x   0.2057 0.2234 
0 , ,B j x   0.0375 0.0299 
1 , A y   0.6248 0.6351 
2 , A y   0.5114 0.5200 
1 , B y   0.6248 0.6351 
2 , B y   0.5114 0.5200 
1 , A π   0.3748 0.3809 
2 , A π   0.3069 0.3121 
1 , B π   0.3748 0.3809 
2 , B π   0.3069 0.3121 
i u   3.013 2.9048 
j u   3.0961 3.0971 
 
 
In Table 5 we experiment with the relative wealth of the two consumers. In the first column the 
initial wealth of agent i is 1.1 while that of j is 0.9, while in the second column the opposite 
happens.   17
 
Table 5: SRI and relative wealth 
 
  9 . 0 , 1 . 1
, 5 . 0 , 5 . 0
0 , 0 , = =
= =
B A W W
γ α
 
1 . 1 , 9 . 0
, 5 . 0 , 5 . 0
0 , 0 , = =
= =
B A W W
γ α
 
0 , ,A i z   0.0 0.0 
0 , ,A j z   1.0 1.0 
0 , ,B i z   0.7701 0.7214 
0 , ,B j z   0.2299 0.2786 
0 , i c   0.7926 0.6825 
0 , j c   0.7203 0.8326 
A p   0.3634 0.3623 
B p   0.3672 0.3651 
0 , ,A i x   0.0 0.0 
0 , ,A j x   0.2423 0.2415 
0 , ,B i x   0.3900 0.3177 
0 , ,B j x   -0.1452 -0.0744 
1 , A y   0.6239 0.6231 
2 , A y   0.5105 0.5098 
1 , B y   0.6265 0.6250 
2 , B y   0.5126 0.5114 
1 , A π   0.3744 0.3739 
2 , A π   0.3063 0.3059 
1 , B π   0.3759 0.3750 
2 , B π   0.3075 0.3069 
i u   3.1194 2.8991 
j u   2.9817 3.2082 
 
 
A change in the distribution of initial wealth has the expected consequences on the solution. 
Relative utilities move in the same direction as relative wealth, and the price of stock of firm A is 
more severely affected by discrimination the larger the share of initial wealth going to the socially 
responsible investor. 
In Table 6 we analyze the effects of the varying degrees of correlation among the four states of 
nature by experimenting with the joint probability distribution. We consider one case where the 
states with shocks which are simultaneously positive or negative have lower probabilities than the 
other two states (we call this case “negative correlation”) and one case where the states with shocks   18
which are simultaneously positive or negative have higher probabilities than the others (“positive 
correlation”).  
 
Table 6: SRI and correlation 
 
5 . 0 , 5 . 0 = = γ α  
1 . 0 , 4 . 0








5 . 0 , 5 . 0 = = γ α  
4 . 0 , 1 . 0








0 , ,A i z   0.0 0.0 
0 , ,A j z   1.0 1.0 
0 , ,B i z   0.7448 0.7471 
0 , ,B j z   0.2552 0.2529 
0 , i c   0.7381 0.7369 
0 , j c   0.7759 0.7771 
A p   0.3619 0.3639 
B p   0.3670 0.3652 
0 , ,A i x   0.0 0.0 
0 , ,A j x   0.2413 0.2426 
0 , ,B i x   0.353 0.3548 
0 , ,B j x   -0.1083 -0.1113 
1 , A y   0.6299 0.6242 
2 , A y   0.5096 0.5107 
1 , B y   0.6264 0.6251 
2 , B y   0.5125 0.5115 
1 , A π   0.3737 0.3745 
2 , A π   0.3058 0.3064 
1 , B π   0.3758 0.3751 
2 , B π   0.3075 0.3069 
i u   3.0106 3.0121 
j u   3.098 3.0959 
 
The first column of Table 6 considers the case where there are higher probabilities to the state 
where a positive shock to productivity of one firm is counterbalanced by a negative shock to the 
productivity of the other firm (negative correlation), while the second considers the reverse case of 
positive correlation. The results confirm that SRI is more painful to the agent when the correlation 
is negative. One can expect that from the hedging portfolio of the investor, trying to smooth 
consumption across states of nature. Also the price differential of the two stocks increases in the   19
negative correlation case with respect to the positive correlation case. This is due to the fact that a 
negative correlation is equivalent to considering the case where stocks are “more different” among 
themselves than the case of positive correlation. Therefore giving up the possibility of investing in 
one asset with a negative correlation is more costly in utility terms, because this exclusion increases 
volatility of consumption across states of nature. 
Finally, Table 7 considers the case where the externality affects both consumer i and consumer j. In 
this case SRI on the part of consumer i benefits both consumers. 
 
Table 7: externality on both consumers 
  5 . 0 , 5 . 0 = = γ α   1 . 1 , 5 . 0 = = γ α  
0 , ,A i z   0.5 0.0 
0 , ,A j z   0.5 1.0 
0 , ,B i z   0.5 0.7384 
0 , ,B j z   0.5 0.2616 
0 , i c   0.7485 0.7496 
0 , j c   0.7485 0.7479 
A p   0.3773 0.3753 
B p   0.3773 0.3784 
0 , ,A i x   0.1258 0.0 
0 , ,A j x   0.1258 0.2502 
0 , ,B i x   0.1258 0.3478 
0 , ,B j x   0.1258 -0.0955 
1 , A y   0.6334 0.632 
2 , A y   0.5181 0.5171 
1 , B y   0.6334 0.6341 
2 , B y   0.5181 0.5188 
1 , A π   0.3800 0.3792 
2 , A π   0.3108 0.3103 
1 , B π   0.3800 0.3805 
2 , B π   0.3108 0.3113 
i u   3.0121 3.0102 
j u   3.0121 3.0132 
 
The first column shows that when both consumers are affected, the equilibrium is symmetric also 
when an externality is present. The second column shows what happens when consumer i 
implements SRI. SRI affects market prices of stocks, as shown by the differential between the price   20
of the two stocks. It therefore indirectly affects the choices of consumer j, who decreases initial 
consumption, buys all of the stock of firm A and decreases the holding of stock B. Production and 
profit by firm A decrease but increase in firm B. Utility of i goes down as a consequence of activism 




We started to explore the consequences of socially responsible investment in a simple two-period 
general equilibrium model. We assume that the firms which are discriminated against generate a 
negative externality towards a part of the consumers. We also assume that discrimination may be 
about all the financial assets issued by the firm or alternatively only the stock. The simulation 
model is simple but powerful enough to show some strong implications. Perhaps one of the main 
messages emerging from the results is that SRI is not likely to be a major force in shaping the 
market equilibrium in cases where it is restricted to a small subset of the agents, there is high 
substitutability across firms and does not consider loans to the firms. As such, it is not likely to 
change the productive choices of the firms and the negative implications for the consumers.  
In a large economy with heterogeneous agents and firms there are many substitution possibilities. 
Firms which are discriminated against from a financial point of view can always find other 
investors who are willing to provide the financial resources necessary for the normal productive 
operations. Responsible agents are unlikely to deeply affect the overall equilibrium. On the other 
hand, their utility loss is likely to be minimal in such a case. SRI produces little but costs little. In a 
large economy there are many firms that issue financial assets which are useful for investors to 
smooth consumption over time. Giving up a priori investments in a given subset of firms does not 
amount to change the consumption program, which can be implemented by means of other financial 
assets. 
Our results are plausible in the context of empirical observations: firms which are the subject of 
investors discrimination do not seem to be deeply affected in terms of performance. Moreover, 
socially responsible mutual funds do not seem to significantly underperform or overperform the 
other mutual funds, as shown by Hamilton, Jo and Statman (1993), and that is what one could 
expect in an environment characterized by large substitution possibilities across financial assets. 
Legal causes against single companies, take for example tobacco companies or pharmaceutical 
companies under the threat of having sold cures which revealed themselves to be dangerous, 
certainly affect the value of the firm. However this is one step beyond SRI per se.   21
Under what conditions can socially responsible behaviour be effective? Our results show that this 
may happen with the increase of the share of responsible investors and with the importance of the 
stock, where the latter concept is defined in terms of hedging against overall uncertainty. These are 
also the conditions in which SRI is particularly painful in utility terms, it may produce a lot but it 
also costs much. 
Of course our results are obtained in the context of a stylized model. SRI is more likely to be 
relevant whenever companies are heavily dependent on the stock market as a financing instrument. 
For example companies are crucially dependent on the stock market in the phase of the initial public 
offering. Also the initial phase of venture capital depends heavily on the possibility to liquidate the 
investment  by means of a public offering. A coalition of socially responsible investors which were 
able to boycott the IPO of a firm might perhaps be useful to block its expansion, even though it is 
hard to believe that other non-responsible investors were not willing to finance a profitable 
business.  
Of course the current negative results on the relevance of SRI may be due to the specific functional 
choices made in this paper. The current version of the model is rather ad hoc and might be 
improved with an extended theoretical base (for example an infinite horizon or an overlapping 
generations structure) and with a richer set of experiments on the relevant parameters. The model 
may be used to understand which combinations of parameters generate an important effect of 
socially responsible investments. Our guess is that socially responsible investments is likely to be 
little effective in all cases of large substitutability across firms and financial assets. If this is true, 
investors will either find that SRI indicators are useful predictors of company profitability and stock 
price performance which merit attention on the grounds of purely financial analysis or drop SRI 
altogether, unless the proportion of investors who are concerned with SRI becomes so large as to 
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